Abstract While the 1995 entrants to the EU are by now fully integrated, those joining in 2004 still "enjoy" a secondary status for a number of years. We attribute this difference to the fact that unlike the former EFTA members joining in 1995, the 2004 entrants formed a group with heterogenous interests, one that lacked the same strong internal economic ties. Not being able to act as a unified block they had a considerably weaker bargaining position. We support our arguments by qualitative results from a simple model, a dynamic partition function game based on Yi
Introduction
The post-World War II division of Europe was soon mirrored in the European trading blocks: the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (or Comecon), the Marshall Plan growing to become the predecessor of the European Union and the looser European Free Trade Association, but not for long. First, we saw a migration of members from the EFTA to the European Economic Community, then the former Comecon members sought entry and most of them have already joined the EU. One feels that Schuman's original ideas "about the equity between all countries" suffered an injury. This is no doubt partly due to the unprecedented differences between entrants and old members, the cost of the expansion, the entrants' poor economic performance and lack of political maturity. In this paper we look at the differences in bargaining position, discussing both possibilities and the actual actions taken, using a game theoretic approach.
Our model is based on a game in a per member partition function form (Thrall and Lucas 1963), a generalisation of the characteristic function form that accounts for externalities. Concerning the nature of these externalities we use three conditions expressed by Yi (1997) . Finally, we consider a dynamic extension of this model (Seidmann and Winter 1998; Gomes 2005) , where players can collect payoffs along the entire process (Morelli and Penelle 1997; Konishi and Ray 2003) .
After the introduction of the notation, terminology and a historical overview we will discuss the accession game, where a number of applicants try seek entry to the Union, following an optimal path (Morelli and Penelle 1997): a sequence of coalition structures that maximises the present value of payoffs.
Preliminaries
We consider a dynamic extension of a cooperative game with externalities where the payoffs are determined by a partition function (Thrall and Lucas 1963) . A partition function assigns a characteristic function to each partition; therefore the same coalition may have different payoffs in different partitions. Our focus is on the size of coalitions rather than on the distribution of coalitional payoffs so we consider a per-member partition function. Due to this symmetry all that matters is the partition of players and the size of the coalition a player belongs to. The usual definitions simplify to the following:
Let n denote the number of players. A group of players is a coalition and is denoted by its size m ≤ n. A coalition structure P = {m 1 , . . . , m k } is a partition of n. (m) collects partitions of m. The set (n) will be denoted .
Definition 1
The pair (n, v) is a per-member partition game if n is a number of players and v is a function that assigns to each player i belonging to coalition m embedded in partition P its payoff v(m, P). Formally v : → (N → R).
Without loss of generality it is assumed that v(m, P) ≥ 0, and v(m, P) = 0 whenever m ∈ P, so v(n, P) > 0 is only possible if P = {N }. Now we consider the dynamic extension of this model. Starting from an initial partition a group of players leaves its current coalitions and forms a new (sub)partition, the new partition becomes the status quo and the process continues. Players
